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Throughout its lengthy history, few issues havecaused the American labor movement moreagony than immigration. It is ironic this should
be the case as most adult immigrants directly enter the
labor force. So eventually do most of their family
members. But precisely because immigration affects the
scale, geographical distribution, and skill composition
of the labor force, it affects national, regional, and local
labor market conditions. Hence, organized labor can
never ignore immigration trends. Immigration has in
the past and continues to affect the developmental course
of American trade unionism. Labor’s responses, in turn,
have significantly influenced the actual public policies
that have shaped the size and character of immigrant
entries.
If organized labor seeks restrictions on
immigration levels as well as the active enforcement of
prevailing laws, it risks alienating itself from immigrants
and makes it difficult to organize them. On the other
hand, if they welcome immigrants, endorse liberal
admission policies, and favor lax enforcement against
violators, the result is that the segments of the labor
supply are inflated and the ensuing market pressures
make it more difficult for unions to win economic gains
for their membership. The reason most workers join
unions in the United States is, after all, largely because
they believe unions can improve and protect their
economic well-being. It also means that organized labor’s
support for immigrant causes would be adverse to
interests of those American workers who do not belong
to unions and who would face increased competition for
jobs as well as wage suppression pressures. Hence,
immigration has always been a “no-win” situation for
American unions.
At every juncture, and with no exception prior
to the 1980s, the union movement either directly
instigated or strongly supported every legislative initiative
enacted by Congress to restrict immigration and to
enforce its policy provisions.1 Labor leaders intuitively
sensed that fluctuations in union membership were
inversely related to prevailing immigration tends. When
immigration increased, union membership tended to
flounder; when immigration declined, union
membership flourished. History has shown that the
leaders’ perceptions were valid (see Figure 1, next page).
But in the late 1980s, the leadership of organized
labor began to waffle on the issue. By the 1990s, the
labor movement was hesitant to support comprehensive
reform despite the fact that the nation was in the midst
of the largest wave of immigration it had ever
experienced and the percentage of the labor force
belonging to unions was declining rapidly. In February
2000, the Executive Council of the American Federation
of Labor –Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-
CIO) announced that it was changing its historic
position.2 It would now support expanded immigration,
lenient enforcement of immigration laws, and the
legislative agenda of immigrants. In the months that
followed, AFL-CIO officials declared that the
organization was now “championing immigrant rights
as a strategic move to make immigrants more
enthusiastic about joining unions.”3 Thus, the one
societal body that had faithfully and consistently supported
reasonable and enforceable immigration policies to
protect the nation’s working people is poised to formally
reverse its historic posture at its biannual convention in
December 2001. Should this happen, the implications
for the future of organized labor and for American
workers are far-reaching. Hitherto, the labor movement
has been the nation’s most effective advocate for the
economic advancement of all workers — union members
or not. If this change occurs, working people —
especially those on the lower rungs of the economic ladder
— will have lost the support of the most effective
champion they ever had.
The Pro-Worker Legacy:
A Review of the Pre-1990s Era
Efforts of working people in the United States to band
together to form organizations representing their
collective economic interests date back to the earliest
days of the Republic. But it was not until the 1850s that
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several national craft unions were able to establish
organizations that were strong enough to survive both
business cycle fluctuations and the fierce opposition of
employers and anti-labor court rulings. Immigration had
been an extremely controversial subject among the populace
prior to this time, but government had yet to formulate
any specific policies to regulate the phenomenon. Early
unions, nevertheless, had to confront the issue. Immigrants
were often used to break strikes and to forestall union
organizing efforts. Collectively, as the number of
immigrants soared in the 1840s and 1850s, it became
increasingly difficult for local unions to secure wage
increases and improvement in working conditions.
But with the coming of the Civil War in 1861,
there was an enormous increase in the demand for the
production of war materials while men of working age
were being conscripted to join the military forces of the
North. In response, the Act to Encourage Immigration
was passed in 1864. It was the nation’s first statutory law
to influence the level of immigration. It is also known as
the Contract Labor Law due to its provisions requiring
those whose transportation costs were paid to repay the
employers for whom the immigrants were obligated to work.
The workers received no wages during this period of what
was essentially a period of indentured servitude. To cover
their food and housing costs, the contract workers usually
had to extend their period of work obligation. Free labor,
obviously, could not compete with workers hired under
such obligatory terms. Contract workers were often used
as strikebreakers when disputes between employers and
unionized workers did occur.
Under these conditions, contract labor quickly
aroused the ire of existing unions. Following the war, the
National Labor Union (NLU) was founded in Baltimore
in 1866. It was a national federation of local assemblies of
craft workers as well as some of the national craft unions
that existed at that time. The NLU viewed the Contract
Labor Act as an artificial method to stimulate immigration
by the government whose intention it was to create a labor
surplus that depressed wages and caused unemployment.
They made the repeal of the legislation an immediate
legislative objective. They were successful in their efforts
as the Act was repealed in 1868. But the repeal only ended
government support for such efforts; it did not ban the
practice, so contract labor continued to thrive as a private
sector recruiting device used by many employers.
The NLU then turned its attention to the issue of
large-scale immigration of unskilled Chinese workers on
the West Coast, which began shortly before the Civil War.
Many of these Chinese workers were also recruited under
contract terms and were often paid far less by employers
than were white workers. They, too, were used as
strikebreakers. Indeed, when Chinese workers were
introduced to the East Coast to replace white workers in a
labor dispute in Massachusetts in 1869 and hired at less
than one-third of the previous wage level, the NLU
responded to the pleas of the white workers to end such
practices nationwide.
Figure 1. Comparrison of the Percentage of the Labor Force Who Belong to Unions
(Since 1860) with Percentage of Population That Is Foreign Born (Since 1790)
Source: See citations in end note 1.
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The immediate focus of NLU’s efforts became
the repeal of the Burlingame Treaty of 1868. This treaty
had been negotiated as part of an effort by the United
States to open China to trade with American businesses.
As an ancillary part of the treaty, it specifically stated that
immigrants from China could enter the United States on
the same terms as immigrants from Europe but that they
could not become naturalized citizens. But the NLU
collapsed when it sought to transform itself into a political
party in order to advocate more effectively for worker
causes during the presidential campaign of 1872.
The baton then was passed to the newly formed
Knights of Labor. Founded in Philadelphia in 1869, it
idealistically sought to become a single national union of
virtually all workers, skilled or unskilled. The Knights’ social
agenda encouraged a broad array of political reforms, but
they accomplished little with the exception of immigration
restrictions, where they accomplished everything they
sought and fought for.
Recognizing that immigration was depressing
wages for most workers and that it provided employers
with an increasing supply of would-be strikebreakers that
hampered union organizing, the Knights launched a full-
scale attack on prevailing immigration policy. In the late
1870s, they began agitation to repeal the Burlingame Treaty
as a way to limit Chinese immigration. In 1879, Congress
voted to repeal the treaty, but President Rutherford Hayes
vetoed the legislation. Hayes did, however, appoint a
commission to renegotiate the treaty and, as a consequence,
the following year Congress enacted legislation allowing
Chinese immigration to be “suspended.” Two years later,
acting largely at the behest of the Knights and a number of
independent craft unions, the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882 was passed. It “suspended ” all Chinese immigration
for 10 years (the suspension was renewed in 1892 for
another 10 years and in 1902 it was made permanent until
it was repealed in 1943 and China was given a token quota).
The Knights then turned their attention to the
continuing issue of contract labor. As a result of their
lobbying pressure, the Alien Contract Act of 1885 was
adopted by Congress. It forbade all recruitment of foreign
workers by American companies. But the legislation
contained no enforcement provisions so the practice
continued. The Knights then succeeded in having the
legislation amended in 1887 to require inspection of new
immigrants at ports of entry to ascertain the terms of arrival
of new immigrants. If they were contract workers, they
were to be returned forthwith to their country of origin.
But there were still no penalties on the American recruiters
so the Knights again sought legislative relief. Another
amendment was added in 1888 that provided fines for
offending corporations who employed contract workers,
payments to informers who provided information about
violators of the law, and the expulsion from the country of
any contract worker found to be employed within one year
after arrival. The Alien Contract Act and its amendments
remained in effect until 1952 when it was repealed. Since
then, foreign recruitment of workers to compete in the
domestic labor market has once more become a mounting
problem for both organized labor and American workers.
By the late 1880s the Knights had lost support
among workers for its emphasis on long-term political
reforms to uplift the miserable economic status of most
working people. The mantle of leadership shifted to the
American Federation of Labor (AFL) that had been formally
established in 1886. as a federation of national unions.
Most of its members were craft unions comprised of skilled
workers, but it was open to membership by industrial
unions (for unskilled workers) if they could successfully
establish themselves. The AFL made the attainment of short
run economic objectives — better wages, shorter hours,
and improved working conditions — its organizational
hallmark.
Samuel Gompers was chosen as president of the
new organization in 1886 and, with the exception of one
year, he held that office until he died 38 years later in
1924. Gompers was himself a Jewish immigrant (from
England) as were many of the members and leaders of the
unions affiliated with the AFL. From his earlier days of
involvement in his own craft union — the cigarmakers —
Gompers became intimately aware of Chinese immigrants’
adverse effects on its members’ wages and employment
opportunities. Indeed, it was his own union that in 1872
introduced in San Francisco the usage of the union label
to distinguish for consumers the cigars produced by workers
employed under a union agreement from those made by
non-union Chinese immigrant workers. Thus, despite his
own immigrant roots, Gompers recognized that organized
labor’s first responsibility was to protect the economic well-
being of workers and not immigrants per se when there
was a conflict in their respective interests. Thus, when
Gompers assumed the presidency of the AFL, “he fathered
the anti-immigration policy of the AFL.”4
In 1892, only six years after the founding of the
AFL, the U.S. Supreme Court finally established in the
The labor movement has been the nation’s
most effective advocate for the economic
advancement of all workers — union
members or not. If this change occurs,
working people — especially those on the
lower rungs of the economic ladder — will
have lost the support of the most effective
champion they ever had.
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clear-cut principle that the federal government has sole
responsibility for the formulation and enforcement of the
nation’s immigration policy.5  The stage was set for organized
labor to press national political leaders to adopt an
immigration policy that set limits and was accountable for
its economic consequences. It was Gompers who boasted
that “the labor movement was among the first organizations
to urge such policies.”6 For, as he made manifestly clear,
“we immediately realize that immigration is, in its
fundamental aspects, a labor problem.”7
Although the subject of immigration, and its
adverse effects on working people, was a frequent subject
of criticism at the early annual conventions of the AFL, it
was not until 1896 that the leadership formally raised the
issue and offered its first resolution to reduce the level of
immigration. Gompers, speaking in its support, proclaimed
that “immigration is working a great injury to the people
of our country.”8  At its 1897 convention, the AFL adopted
a formal resolution for the imposition of a literacy test for
would-be immigrants in their native language. As the vast
preponderance of immigrants at the time were illiterate,
its enactment also would have dramatically reduced the
level of immigration. In 1905, the AFL renewed its support
for literacy tests and did so at every successive convention
until such legislation was finally adopted in 1917.9
Meanwhile, when the renewal of the Chinese
Exclusion Act in 1902 came before Congress, the issue of
restriction of Japanese immigration also surfaced. Prior
to 1900, there were virtually no Japanese immigrants on
the mainland of the United States, but there had been
considerable Japanese immigration to the Hawaiian Islands.
Soon after Hawaii was unilaterally annexed by the United
States in 1898, many Japanese immigrants began to migrate
from Hawaii to the West Coast. In response, a grassroots
movement of worker groups in San Francisco in 1900
began to agitate to have the Japanese included in the pending
renewal of Chinese exclusion in 1902. It did not happen.
But at its 1904 convention held in San Francisco, the AFL
demanded that the Chinese Exclusion Act be amended by
new legislation to include immigrants from Japan.10
Separate legislation was introduced in 1905 in Congress
to do this, but it died due to opposition of President
Theodore Roosevelt.
But in 1906, the issue exploded on the national
scene when the San Francisco School Board ordered all
Japanese children to attend the Oriental School located in
Chinatown. Local labor unions had strongly supported this
move and Samuel Gompers gave his support to the proposal
after the decision had been made.11 The issue quickly
involved President Roosevelt. He was attempting to
formulate a policy reflecting U.S. commercial interests in
the Far East. Roosevelt labeled the action of the School
Board as “wicked absurdity” which comforted the Japanese
government but did not assuage the attitudes in California.
Softer tactics were required and the President invited the
School Board to Washington for discussions. In this
meeting, he promised to end Japanese immigration in return
for the rescinding of the ethnic classification policy by the
School Board. It agreed to do so. Shortly after, Secretary
of State Elihu Root proposed that the government of Japan
impose restrictions that forbade its citizens from
emmigrating to the United States. In return, the United
States agreed it would not enact any formal legislation to
exclude Japanese citizens from imigrating to the United
States. The relationship is referred to as the Gentleman’s
Agreement. It was finalized through an exchange of
diplomatic correspondences in February 1908 and became
effective at once.
During the first decade of the 20th Century,
immigration levels reached record heights. Organized labor
and other groups became increasingly concerned. In
response, President Theodore Roosevelt gave his support
to a congressional proposal to create a commission to study
the impact of mass immigration. Gompers and the AFL
strongly supported the idea. Subsequently, the Immigration
Commission (chaired by Senator William Dillingham (R-
Vt.), was established in 1907 to conduct a comprehensive
investigation.
When the Immigration Commission issued its
report in 1911, it confirmed the AFL’s beliefs that mass
immigration was depressing wages, causing unemployment,
spreading poverty, and impairing the organizational efforts
of unions.12 Unfortunately, the report also sought to link
the economic effects with dubious sociological and
anthropological attributes of the more recent immigrants
that questioned their ability to assimilate. The
Commission’s mixture of the legitimate economic
arguments with questionable ethnocentric biases has
plagued all subsequent efforts to dispassionately reform
the nation’s immigration system.
Nonetheless, the Dillingham Commission
recommended that the nation place a ceiling on annual
immigration and that it be low enough to significantly
reduce the annual rate of entry. It also proposed that the
immigration system be much more selective as to whom it
admits and whom it does not.
In the wake of the Commission’s final report,
efforts to enact its policy recommendations commenced.
As mentioned, the literacy test requirement was adopted
in 1917 and an Asiatic Barred Zone was created that, in
conjunction with restrictions already in place, essentially
banned almost all immigration from Asian countries. When
mass immigration from Europe resumed after being
interrupted by World War I, the Immigration Act of 1921
(a temporary step) followed by the Immigration Act of
1924 (a permanent step) sharply curtailed admissions. These
actions placed a low ceiling on the number of immigrants
(about 154,000 visas per year plus immediate family
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members who were spouses and minor children) who could
enter from the Eastern Hemisphere (countries in the
Western Hemisphere were not covered). They also set
country quotas that favored countries in Northern and
Western Europe and disfavored those from Eastern and
Southern Europe.13
The AFL and most national labor leaders strongly
supported all of these legislative actions. For instance, A.
Philip Randolph, who would soon become president of a
national union affiliated with the AFL and who in later
years would become a prominent leader of the nation’s
civil rights movement, heralded all of these restrictive
actions. In 1924, he stated that the nation was suffering
from “immigration indigestion” and that even the newly
enacted low quotas were still too high. He suggested that
“zero” immigration was the appropriate level.14
With the passage of the restrictive legislation in
1924, which was followed by the depression decade of the
1930s and by World War II during the first half of the
1940s, immigration levels fell drastically. For the first time
in over a century, immigration ceased to be an issue of
significant threat to the labor movement. As a consequence,
organized labor could focus its attention on employer and
governmental policies that opposed the spread of unionism.
It was not long before union membership soared (see Figure
1, page 2).
Following World War II, the AFL supported the
efforts of President Harry Truman to find ways to admit
some European refugees who had been displaced during
the war years. But the AFL made it clear that it viewed
their limited admissions as a very special circumstance.
At its 1946 convention, the AFL adopted a resolution ex-
plaining that approval of these ad hoc measures “in no way
modifies the existing immigration laws, which have always
had the support of the American Federation of Labor.”15
It was also in the postwar years that the AFL
strongly criticized another aspect of the nation’s
immigration policy: the Mexican Labor Program (popularly
called the “bracero” program). It had been initiated in
1942 at the behest of the agriculture industry in the
Southwest as a temporary wartime emergency measure. It
permitted Mexican farm workers to work for American
growers during planting and harvesting seasons and then
return to Mexico. Ostensibly, the program provided
employment guarantees to these workers pertaining to their
wages and employment conditions. When the war ended,
the program was continued for 22 years, until 1964. By
then, employers had become addicted to the cheap and
dependable supply of Mexican labor and resisted efforts to
terminate the program. Organized labor, supported by
extensive research, contended that employers regularly
undermined the worker protections and wage requirements
so that the program exploited Mexican workers while
making it impossible to unionize American farmworkers.
Hence, the AFL fought for its termination.
When the AFL merged with its rival federation,
the CIO, in 1955, a resolution was passed at the inaugural
convention that year in which the AFL-CIO joined with
immigration reformers who were seeking to end the overtly
discriminatory admission systems that had been in place
since 1924. It was widely recognized that the terms of that
law were hampering efforts to achieve even its low
admission ceiling. Nations with high quotas did not fill
them while nations with low quotas had massive backlogs
of would-be immigrants who could not enter. The
resolution called for the creation of a new selection system
without suggesting that the low level of immigration itself
be raised.
Such legislation was formally proposed by
President John F. Kennedy in the summer of 1963, but
Congress took up the issue until 1965. The AFL-CIO
renewed its support for the reform legislation. The
Immigration Act of 1965 was subsequently passed and
signed by President Lyndon Johnson. As with all other
supporters of the legislation, the AFL-CIO believed that
the goal was to end the discriminatory national origins
admission system, not to raise the level of immigration by
more than a very modest amount (i.e., to 290,000 plus
immediate family members, which was expanded to include
adult parents of immigrants). The foreign-born population
had been declining as a percentage of the nation’s population
for over 40 years (see Table 1, opposite). By 1965, it was
at its lowest level (4.4 percent) in the history of the nation.
No one anticipated that the door of mass immigration
was about to swing open once again, but this is exactly
what happened.
The Immigration Act of 1965 did end the national
origins admissions system. A new system was created that
emphasized family reunification (74 percent of the available
visas each year), downgraded the number of employment-
based visas (20 percent of the available visas), and created
new refugee admission categories (6 percent of the available
visas). The legislation did not, however, provide provisions
to assure that its terms were enforced against those who
might seek to enter illegally. Furthermore, the new law
had unanticipated consequences: Legal immigration levels
more than doubled (due to their being more immediate
family members than were anticipated), the refugee
provisions were overwhelmed by political decisions to admit
far more persons than the law provided (especially from
Cuba and Indochina), and there was a sharp rise in illegal
immigration due to the lack of effective enforcement
provisions.
For these reasons, the issue of immigration reform
was back on the national policy agenda by the mid-1970s.
Responding to legislative proposals made by President
Jimmy Carter, Congress authorized the creation of a
commission to study all aspects of the nation’s immigration
system. Known as the Select Commission on Immigration
and Refugee Policy (SCIRP), it was chaired by the Rev.
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Theodore Hesburgh, president of Notre Dame University.
When it issued its final report in March 1981, Commission
declared that the nation’s immigration system was “out of
control” and made numerous recommendations for reform.16
Because of the worsening of the refugee issue at
the time, the Commission’s proposals for refugee reforms
were enacted before the actual issuance of its final report.
They were embodied in the Refugee Act of 1980, which
separated refugee admissions from the remainder of the
nation’s immigration system. The Commission’s remaining
proposals pertained to changes in the legal immigration
system and additional enforcement muscle to combat illegal
immigration. These reforms were incorporated into a
bipartisan bill proposed by Senator Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)
and Representative Romano Mazzoli (D-Ky.) in 1982. Their
efforts to pass comprehensive immigration reform,
however, were unsuccessful in both 1982 and 1984. Thus,
a new tack was taken: piecemeal reform. The issue of illegal
immigration was selected for first attention. Legislation
making it illegal for employers in the United States to hire
illegal immigrants while providing four different amnesties
for most of those persons already in the country illegally
was adopted in 1986 with the passage of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA).
The AFL-CIO strongly supported the 1986
legislation.17 At its 1985 convention, policy resolutions were
passed that supported the adoption of sanctions against
employers who hire illegal immigrants, favored the creation
of “an eligibility verification system that is secure and non-
forgeable,” created an amnesty program for illegals already
in the United States, did not provide for “any new
‘guestworker’ or ‘bracero’ program,” and called for the
careful regulation of programs to admit foreign temporary
workers only for “those situations where U.S. workers
cannot reasonably be found.”18 After IRCA was passed,
the AFL-CIO adopted a resolution in 1987 that called the
legislation “the most important and far reaching
immigration legislation in 30 years” and, it noted that in
particular “the AFL-CIO applauds the inclusion in that
law of employer sanctions and of a far-reaching legalization
[i.e., amnesty] program.”19
The Pro-Immigrant Era: Post-1990
When Congress next turned its attention to reform of legal
immigration (in the late 1980s), the AFL-CIO did not
take a prominent role in the political posturing preceding
the ultimate passage of the Immigration Act of 1990. While
it did not clearly articulate what it favored, it did specify
what it was against.20 At its 1989 Convention, a resolution
was adopted that stated that it “opposes any reduction in
the number of family-based visas or any erosion in the
definition of the family.” Furthermore, it opposed
increasing the number of employment-based immigrants
because they represented “a brain drain” of other nations
and the AFL-CIO preferred to expand domestic policies
“to increase our investment in education and job training
in this country.” The only specific provision the AFL-CIO
sought to influence was a section of non-immigrant labor
policy governing the temporary admission of foreign
performing talent and their accompanying technical
workers (e.g., foreign film crews).21
The Immigration Act of 1990 passed and
significantly raised legal immigration levels to 700,000 visas
a year beginning in 1991 through 1994 and to 675,000
visas per year thereafter. It did not reduce the number of
family-based visas (in fact, it increased them), nor did it
change the definition of what constitutes a family. The
number of employment-based visas was significantly
increased from 54,000 to 140,000 per year. It added a
new “diversity” admission category (originally with 40,000
visas per year but increasing to 55,000 visas per year
beginning in 1995); and it made it easier for employers to
get access to a variety of foreign workers on a temporary
basis. Labor did obtain the tidbit it sought. A cap of 25,000
visas per year was placed on the annual number of newly
created “P visas” available for foreign workers in the
entertainment industry.
At its 1993 convention, the AFL-CIO reversed
course entirely. The convention adopted a resolution that
praised the role that immigrants have played “in building
the nation and its democratic ideas.”22 The resolution went
even further by demonizing unidentified advocates of
immigration reform for launching “a new hate campaign
cynically designed to exploit public anxiety by making
immigrants and refugees the scapegoats for economic and
social problems.”23 It concluded that “immigrants are not
the cause of our nation’s problems” and stated that “the
AFL-CIO reiterates its long standing commitment
to…provide fair opportunities for legal immigration
and…due process of law for all people who enter, or attempt
to enter, the United States illegally.”24 The resolution also
encouraged affiliated unions “to develop programs to
address the special needs of immigrant members and
potential members” and called for member unions to work
with “immigrant advocacy groups and service organizations”
to protect the interests of new immigrants.25 Clearly, an
entirely new immigration attitude was emerging within
the leadership of the AFL-CIO.
Meanwhile, the Immigration Act of 1990 also
authorized the creation of another commission to study
the impact of the new legislation and the effectiveness of
existing immigration laws. The Commission on
Immigration Reform (CIR) was chaired by Barbara Jordan
(a former member of Congress, but a professor of public
policy at the University of Texas at the time) for most of its
six-year life. CIR issued a series of interim reports and
culminated its work with a final report in 1997.26 CIR
concluded that “our current immigration system must
undergo major reform” and requires “a significant
7Center for Immigration Studies
redefinition of priorities.”27 It recommended a 35 percent
reduction of legal admissions (back to the pre-1990 levels),
the elimination of the extended family preferences for
admission, the elimination of the employment-based
provision that permits unskilled workers to be admitted,
and a return to the policy of including refugees within the
total number of immigrants that are to be admitted each
year.
Against that backdrop, the AFL-CIO entered the
fray by opposing all of the proposed changes. In 1995, it
repeated its charge that immigration reformers were making
immigrants “scapegoats” and that proposals for
comprehensive immigration reforms were being used “to
unfairly exploit public concern over illegal immigrants.”28
Despite extensive research findings to the contrary, the
policy resolution asserted that “the notion that immigrants
are to blame for the deteriorating living standards of
America’s low-wage workers must be clearly rejected.”29
Rather than immigration reform, it proposed increasing
the minimum wage, adopting universal health care, and
enacting labor law reform as the remedies for the widening
income disparity in the nation.
Aware of the principal findings of CIR by this
time, Congress took up the issue of immigration reform
in the spring of 1996, even though CIR’s final report had
yet to be issued. During its debates, the AFL-CIO allied
itself with the National Association of Manufacturers,
Americans for Tax Reform, the National Christian
Coalition, and civil libertarians to oppose most of the
proposed changes. Together, they succeeded in having
Congress separate all the legal-immigration reform measures
from the pending bill and then kill them, stripping from
the remaining bill the key proposals for verification of the
authenticity of Social Security numbers as a way to reduce
illegal immigration, and dropping efforts to limit refugee
admissions. By joining with a coalition of some of the
most anti-union organizations in the country, labor leaders
succeeded in blocking immigration reform designed
primarily to protect the economic well-being of low skilled
workers in the nation. The rationale offered by labor
officials was that their new organizing targets had increased
some unions’ contact with large urban concentrations of
immigrants. Hence, the labor movement needed to
undertake a more accommodative stance.
The AFL-CIO believes that all workers who are
in the United States ought to receive the full protection of
existing labor laws regardless of their legal status. This is
seen as a social justice issue at the work site, which is a
traditional union concern. But it is also the case that there
are self-defense motivations involved. Some employers use
the threat (or the actual practice) of turning illegal
immigrants in to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) if they seek to vote (or do vote) in union
certification elections.30 U.S. courts have upheld the right
of “all employees — including those who may be subject
to termination in the future…to vote on whether they want
to be represented by a union.”31 Furthermore, the INS
announced in the spring of 1999 that it was essentially
abandoning enforcement of employer sanctions at the work
site in favor of focusing on human smuggling activities,
border management, and criminal deportations. This means
that illegal immigrants have little reason to fear INS raids
unless employers report them.32 Thus, if illegal immigrants
are at the work site, unions have to organize the workers
that employers hire. If the INS is not going to police work
sites, unions must seek to enlist the illegal immigrants as
members or abandon their organizing efforts with the
enterprise in question. Should unions give up such
organizing, employers will have an even greater incentive
to hire more illegal immigrants than they already do. Thus,
organizing and protecting illegal immigrants is not a matter
of principle, it is a matter of necessity.
At its October 1999 biennial convention held in
Los Angeles, the pro-immigrant element within the AFL-
CIO made its move. Gaining support from unions rep-
resenting janitors,
garment workers,
restaurant workers,
and hotel house-
keepers, they argued
that unions needed
to overtly embrace
immigrants if the
movement was to
survive.33 They
buttressed their case
by citing incidents
whereby employers
used immigration
law to intimidate or
to dismiss im-
migrant workers
who were involved
in trying to form
unions. In
particular, these
advocates sought to
end the employer
sanctions provision
created by IRCA in
1986 (which
organized labor had
strongly supported)
and to enact yet
another general
amnesty for those
Table 1. Foreign-Born
Percentage of Total
U.S. Population
Year
1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1965
1970
1980
1990
2000
Number
(Millions)
0.5
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
2.2
4.1
5.6
6.7
9.2
10.3
13.5
13.9
14.2
11.5
10.3
9.7
8.5
9.6
14.1
19.7
30.5
Percentage
of Total
Population
12.8
11.3
11.1
10.4
9.3
8.2
9.7
13.2
14.4
13.3
14.8
13.6
14.7
13.2
11.6
8.8
6.9
5.4
4.4
4.7
6.2
7.9
11.2
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illegal immigrants now in the country. Support for this
effort was far from unanimous and a floor fight seemed
probable.
To avoid a public confrontation, AFL-CIO
officials agreed that the motion would be briefly debated
and then referred to a committee for study. It was done.
When the AFL-CIO Executive Committee met in New
Orleans in February 2000, it consummated its break from
the past. It was announced that the AFL-CIO would seek
to have the employer sanctions provisions of IRCA repealed
and that it favored a new amnesty to cover most of the six
million illegal immigrants believed to be in the United
States.34 After the meeting, the president of the Hotel and
Restaurant Employees Union, John Wilhelm, said “the
labor movement is on the side of immigration in this
country.”35 Business lobbyists hailed the new policy stance.36
The New York Times, on the other hand, editorialized
that “the AFL-CIO’s proposal should be rejected” as it
would “undermine the integrity of the country’s
immigration laws and would depress the wages of the lowest-
paid native born workers.”37
Research Supports Labor’s
Pre-1990s Restrictive Posture
Research on mass immigration’s impact on the economic
well-being of workers has consistently found that organized
labor’s support for restrictive measures was amply justified.
Economists Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson found
that in the post Civil-War era, when the fledgling labor
movement initially began to press for immigration reforms,
urban real wages would have been 14 percent higher in
1890 had it not been for the high immigration levels of the
preceding 20 years.38 Their findings supported the earlier
conclusions of Stanley Lebergott that real wages in the 25
years following the Civil War tended to move inversely
with the ebbs and flows of immigration levels over this
period.39
Likewise, studies of the massive immigration that
occurred between 1890 and 1914 were even more
supportive of the AFL’s strenuous efforts to reduce
immigration levels during this era. Hatton and Williamson
found that, in the absence of the large-scale immigration
that occurred after 1890, the urban real wage would have
been 34 percent higher in 1910. Parenthetically, they
observed that “with an impact that big, no wonder the
Immigration Commission produced a massive report in
1911 that supported quotas!”40 Likewise, economists Harry
Millis and Royal Montgomery wrote of this era that
organized labor was correct in its assessment of adverse
economic impact of immigration on American workers
“as labor markets were flooded, the labor supply was made
more redundant, and wages were undermined.”41
Following the passages of the restrictive
Immigration Act of 1921 and the Immigration Act of 1924,
which enacted the first ceilings on immigration in U.S.
history, the economic gains to workers were found to be
immediate. Indeed, labor historian Joseph Rayback called
the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924 “the most
significant pieces of ‘labor’ legislation enacted during” the
post-World War I era.42 Millis and Montgomery likewise
observed “from the international viewpoint the morality
of the postwar immigration policy of the United States
may be questioned, but of its economic effect in raising
real earnings there can be little question.”43 Lebergott, who
attributed the tripling of real wages for urban workers that
occurred in the 1920s to the substantial immigration
reductions that occurred in this period, observed that
“political changes in the supply of labor can be more effective
in determining wages than even explicit attempts to fix
wages.”44 What more powerful statements can be made
about the significance of the adoption of reasonable
immigration polices to the enhancement of worker welfare
in the United States?
Research Does Not Support
Labor’s Emerging Policy Shift
In 1997, a special panel created by the National Research
Council (NRC) issued a report on the economic effects of
the contemporary immigration experience of the United
States.45  The research had been contracted by CIR to
provide the basis for the conduct of its six-year investigation
of immigration’s impact on the nation’s people. The NRC
report catalogued the fact that the educational attainment
levels of post–1965 immigrants have steadily declined.
Consequently, foreign-born workers, on average, earn less
than native-born workers and the earnings gap has widened
over the years. Those from Latin America (including
Mexico) presently account for over half of the entire
foreign-born population of the nation, and they earn the
lowest wages. The NRC found no evidence of
discriminatory wages being paid to immigrants; rather, it
found that immigrant workers are paid less than native-
born workers because, in fact, they are less skilled and less
educated. The relative declines in both skills and wages of
the foreign-born population was attributed to the fact that
most immigrants are coming from the poorer nations of
the world, where the average wages, educational attainment,
and skill levels are far below those in the United States. As
a direct consequence, post-1965 immigrants are
disproportionately increasing the segment of the nation’s
labor supply that has the lowest human capital endowments.
In the process, they are suppressing the wages of all workers
in the lowest skill sector of the labor market. More
specifically, the study documented the fact that almost half
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of the decline in real wages for native-born high school
dropouts (i.e., unskilled workers) from 1980-1994 could
be attributed to the adverse competitive impact of unskilled
foreign workers. It was for this very reason that Barbara
Jordan summarized CIR’s proposed recommendations on
legal immigration reform by stating:
What the Commission is concerned about are the
unskilled workers in our society. In an age in which
unskilled workers have far too few opportunities
opened to them, and in which welfare reform will
require thousands more to find jobs, the Commission
sees no justification to the continued entry of unskilled
foreign workers.46
It was in the same macro context that the Council
of Economic Advisers (CEA) to the President identified
post — 1965 mass immigration as being one of the
contributing factors to the worsening income disparity that
the nation experienced has since 1968. In 1994, the CEA
explained that “immigration has increased the relative
supply of less-educated labor and appears to have
contributed to the increasing inequality of income.”47
In addition, there have been a host of studies at
the micro level that have documented the adverse impact
immigration has had one the ability of unions to organize
workers, retain representation rights, and achieve economic
gains for those who are organized.48 A survey of some of
these experiences, done jointly in a report by the U.S.
Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Labor
in 1999, concluded that “unions have been weakened
directly by the use of recent immigrants.”49
Concluding Observations
With only two exceptions, membership in American unions
has, over time, moved inversely with trends in the size of
immigration inflows (see Figure 1). One exception was
from 1897 to 1905, when both union membership and
immigration increased. But it was a period when the nation
was recovering from a major depression and the economy
was rapidly industrializing. The other was from 1922 to
1929 when, conversely, both union membership and
immigration declined. But this was an era of all-out assault
on unionism by business, government, and the courts.50
Other than these two periods, when very special
circumstances prevailed, the inverse relationship has
generally prevailed. It has been manifestly the case since
1932.
Since 1965, when policymakers inadvertently
renewed mass immigration, the foreign-born population
of the United States has increased by 231 percent (from
8.5 million immigrants to 28.4 million immigrants), and
the civilian labor force has risen by 86 percent (from 74.4
million workers, to 139 million workers), but union
membership has fallen by 10 percent (from 18.2 million
members, to 16.3 million members) over this interval.
Since 1968 (the year the Immigration Act of 1965 took
full effect), the distribution of income within the nation
has steadily become more unequal. The decline in union
membership and the impact of mass immigration both
have been identified by the CEA as contributing
explanations for the worsening income inequality in the
nation.51
In this environment, mass immigration has once
more done what it did in the past: it has lessened the
effectiveness of unions and, accordingly, diminished their
attractiveness to workers. To be sure, there are other factors
involved in the decline of union membership.52 The nation’s
laws, for instance, that supposedly protect the practice of
collective bargaining are woefully inadequate when
confronted with willful employer opposition. They, too,
need to be reformed. Likewise, globalization and
technological change have radically altered the nation’s
industrial and occupational structures to the disadvantage
of organized labor’s historic membership strengths. But
the drastic weakening of the economic status of many
working people in this new era argues for increased union
representation now more than ever. Mass immigration —
especially of unskilled and poorly educated persons — has
significantly contributed to all of the income disparity
pressures besetting the work force (be they native- born or
foreign-born).
The nation’s immigration laws need to be
strengthened, not weakened or repealed. Employer
sanctions set the moral tone for immigration policy at the
workplace. The identification loopholes need to be plugged
and worksite enforcement given priority, not neglect.There
should not be more mass amnesties for persons who have
brazenly violated the laws that, since 1986, clearly state
that illegal immigrants should not be in the workplace in
the first place. Such amnesties only encourage others to
enter illegally and hope for another amnesty. Moreover,
the mass amnesty of persons who are overwhelmingly
unskilled and poorly educated only adds to the competition
for low wage jobs with the citizens and permanent resident
aliens.
Rather than pursue its past role as a careful
monitor of the impact of the nation’s immigration policies
on the economic well-being of working people, the AFL-
CIO is poised to become an advocate for the pro-immigrant
political agenda. But this strategy comes with a heavy cost.
First, it means that success in the organization of
immigrants will not translate into any real ability to increase
“Political changes in the supply of labor can
be more effective in determining wages
than even explicit attempts to fix wages.”
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significantly the wages or benefits of many such organized
workers. As long as the labor market continues to be flooded
with low-skilled immigrant job seekers, unions will not be
able to defy the market forces that will suppress upward
wage pressures. Secondly, the focus on the advancement
of the interests of low-skilled immigrants can only cause
the alienation of low-skilled native-born workers who must
compete for these same jobs because they lack the human
capital to qualify for better ones. How long can it be until
these other workers recognize that their ambitions for
higher wages and better living standards cannot be achieved
as long as mass immigration is allowed to flood low wage
labor markets?
The fundamental issue for labor has never been a
question of whether unions should organize immigrants.
Of course they must, as they have always done. Rather, it
is should labor seek to organize workers specifically because
they are immigrants, and in the process become a proactive
advocate for immigrant causes? Or should unions do as
they have in the past: seek to organize all workers purely
on the grounds of the pursuit of their economic well-being?
If labor seeks to organize immigrants on the same
basis it does native-born workers (i.e., making no
distinction between the nativity of workers), there is no
reason to embrace the broad range of immigration policy
issues. Indeed, the hard lesson of labor history is that the
more generous the immigration policy, the worse it is for
all workers in their efforts to raise wages, to improve
working conditions, and to secure employment
opportunities. The wisdom of Melvin Reder, a pioneer in
the analysis of the labor market impact of immigration,
should always be kept in mind:
Our immigration policy inevitably reflects a kind of
national selfishness of which the major beneficiaries
are the least fortunate among us. We could not
completely abandon the policy, even if we so desired.53
The distinguishing feature of the American labor
movement has always been its pragmatic focus on the
achievement of economic gains for its members rather
than the abstract pursuit of political objectives. The recent
actions taken by the AFL-CIO Executive Council reverse
this course. In seeking to join with the “rainbow” political
alliance, it offers policies that are patently harmful to the
well-being of the nation’s workers. What is bad economics
for working people cannot be good politics for unions.
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Throughout its lengthy history, few issues have causedthe American labor movement more agony thanimmigration. It is ironic this should be the case as
most adult immigrants directly enter the labor force. So
eventually do most of their family members. But precisely
because immigration affects the scale, geographical
distribution, and skill composition of the labor force, it
affects national, regional, and local labor market conditions.
Hence, organized labor can never ignore immigration trends.
Immigration has in the past and continues to affect the
developmental course of American trade unionism. Labor’s
responses, in turn, have significantly influenced the actual
public policies that have shaped the size and character of
immigrant entries.
